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LA WS OFFEAR: BEYOND THE PRECA UTIONAR Y PRINCIPLE

BY CASS R. SUNSTEIN (CAMBRIDGE & NEW
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005) 234 pages.1

YORK:

BY BRYAN BOODHOO

I.

2

INTRODUCTION

Regulators have used the precautionary principle for decades.
Although it came to prominence as a tool for making environmental
policy decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty, regulators and
governments have invoked the precautionary principle in areas such as
food safety, crime prevention, and terrorism. In its weakest form, the
precautionary principle posits that the absence of decisive evidence of
harm is not a reason to refuse to regulate. 3 A comparatively stronger
version posits that when an action poses unknown risks, that action
should be prohibited until scientific evidence shows the damage will not

'[Laws ofFear].
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occur.4 In Cass Sunstein's book, Laws of Fear, which is based on a
number of lectures he gave at University of Cambridge, the author's
initial thesis is that in its strongest form, the precautionary principle is
inconsistent. Sunstein argues that there are risks on all sides of a social
situation.5 Not only are there risks against which the precautionary
principle guards, but there are also risks that arise from the regulation
that the precautionary principle mandates.6 Because there are risks
associated both with regulating and not regulating, the precautionary
principle, Sunstein argues, gives no clear policy direction.7
Although the risks of regulation may not be as obvious as the
risks against which the precautionary principle guards, both types of risk
can be serious. In a 2004 survey, scientists were asked what notable
achievements would have been prevented or limited by the
precautionary principle. 8 The resulting list included airplanes, air
conditioning, antibiotics, automobiles, chlorine, open-heart surgery, and
refrigeration. 9 This list demonstrates that the decision to prohibit
potentially harmful activities can in itself have comparable or greater
harms than the harms against which the precautionary principle guards.
For example, experimental open-heart surgery may kill the patient in
question, but a prohibition on experimental surgery may also cause the
death of the patient as well as others who might have been saved by the
knowledge that could have been gained from that surgery. When faced
with a choice between potential harms associated with action and
inaction, the strongest form of the precautionary principle offers little
guidance. Against which harms should regulators guard?
Sunstein's contribution to the expansive literature surrounding
the precautionary principle is not in disproving the precautionary
principle in its strongest form, but rather in showing how psychology
affects regulation, particularly the precautionary principle. Sunstein uses
cognitive concepts to explain why regulators apply the precautionary
principle to some risks but not to others. He proposes that by
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recognizing cognitive biases, regulators may be able to apply the
precautionary principle more precisely. Sunstein suggests a method by
which regulators can use cost-benefit analysis to help refine applications
of the precautionary principle.
II.

CHOOSING THE RISKS

Different people and different nations choose different risks
against which to take precautions. For example, while the United States
took precautions against mad cow disease, European nations acted with
caution regarding genetically modified foods." Psychology, according to
Sunstein, explains why different people and different nations apply the
precautionary principle to different risks. Sunstein focuses on five
factors: (1) the availability heuristic; (2) probability neglect; (3) loss
aversion; (4) a belief in the benevolence of nature; and (5) system
neglect."
The availability heuristic is a cognitive short cut that allows
people to assess risks based on their past experiences. People who have
had recent, intense experiences of earthquakes, for example, are more
likely to protect themselves against earthquakes than people who have
not had those experiences.12 Thus, the frequency and intensity of an
event influence a person's assessment of the probability of that event
happening again. 3
Probability neglect occurs when people focus on worst-case
scenarios without contemplating the chances that those scenarios will
occur. For Sunstein, probability neglect explains why the precautionary
principle seems to give clear policy guidance. Without considering the
probability of a risk occurring, the precautionary principle will lean
towards prohibiting risky activity. Notably, the availability heuristic can
lead to probability neglect. Regulators tend to overestimate the
likelihood of a recent disaster reoccurring.
Theories of loss aversion assert that "loss from the status quo is
seen as more undesirable than a gain is seen as desirable."' 4 As a result
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of loss aversion, people tend to be more aware of the potential negative
results of a decision rather than any foregone benefits. 5 According to a
related cognitive concept, people tend to prefer familiar risks over
unfamiliar ones. 6
The belief in the benevolence of nature is a belief that nature is
essentially benevolent and that human action carries risks.17 System
neglect asserts that people tend to "fixate on isolated problems and do
not see the complex, system-wide effects of particular interventions.""8
All of these concepts help to make the precautionary principle
operational. By explaining why people fear certain risks more than
others, Sunstein helps demonstrate why regulators invoke the
precautionary principle for some risks and not others.
Sunstein focuses his discussion on probability neglect, showing
that emotions can affect risk assessment. In a study he conducted to
measure the roles of probability and emotion in risk assessment,
Sunstein surveyed eighty-three University of Chicago law students about
their willingness to pay to prevent the risk of cancer caused by arsenic in
drinking water. He divided the participants into four groups and asked
the first two groups how much they would be willing to pay to prevent a
cancer risk of 1 out of 1,000,000 and 1 out of 100,000 respectively. He
posed the same scenarios to the third and fourth groups, but described
the symptoms as "very gruesome and intensely painful, as the cancer
eats away at the internal organs of the body."' 9 In both cases, when
Sunstein posed the question using emotional language, the participants'
willingness to pay increased by more than 20 per cent.2 ° Sunstein
concludes, in part, that his experiment is evidence that emotions can
lead to probability neglect. However, the participants' willingness to pay
in groups three and four may have been influenced by their desire to
avoid painful deaths. Additionally, the participants, as law students, do
not represent the general population, nor are there enough of them to
make Sunstein's findings statistically significant. A better experiment
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could have been designed and executed. Nevertheless, Sunstein provides
other convincing evidence that fear can lead to probability neglect.
Concern or fear of a harm can perpetuate itself through a group
of people. Someone not concerned about global warming, for example,
will probably become more worried about the problem if multiple
sources express concern, especially if the concern focuses on worst-case
scenarios. 2' The media can perpetuate this problem by covering stories
of risk based on economic self-interest rather than the likelihood that an
event will occur.22 Although it is not unreasonable for individuals to take
precautions based on fear or heuristics, governments should have a
better foundation for their policy decisions.
SOLUTIONS TO COGNITIVE BIAS

III.

Cost-benefit analysis is often offered as an alternative to the
precautionary principle. By comparing costs and benefits based on a
common measure, usually money, regulators who use cost-benefit
analysis attempt to make policy decisions that maximize efficiency. Costbenefit analysis has its limitations. On the benefits side, eliminating the
risk of a great harm that has a low probability of occurring is roughly
equivalent to eliminating a moderate harm with a moderate probability
of occurring. There is little room in a cost-benefii analysis for regulators
to distinguish between these two types of risks. On the cost side,
regulators should not consider the severity of the costs or the
distribution of those costs among the population, so long as regulatory
decisions maximize efficiency. Sunstein attempts to reconcile the
differences between cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary
principle by introducing "cognitive cost-benefit analysis." 23 Unlike
traditional cost-benefit analysis, cognitive cost-benefit analysis does not
depend upon economic efficiency; rather, it uses the accounting
cognitive biases by "showing
methods of cost-benefit analysis to avoid
24
what is at stake" in regulatory decisions.
There are problems, however, with trying to incorporate
cognitive cost-benefit analysis into the precautionary principle. By
21 Ibid.at
22
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assigning monetary values to risks, regulators convey a false sense of
certainty about risks, which are inherently difficult to quantify. The
assumption that harms can be compared allows cost-benefit analysis to
give clear policy direction. If this assumption is wrong, or if regulators
do not compare all relevant factors among different policy choices, then
the guidance that cost-benefit analysis offers will not be reliable. Even
though Sunstein suggests a limited use of cost-benefit analysis, it seems
difficult to justify favouring a precautionary approach over a cost-benefit
approach, even if regulators only use a limited cognitive cost-benefit
analysis. If the precautionary principle pointed towards regulation, and
cost-benefit analysis suggested that regulation would not be efficient,
would it not follow, that the precautionary principle suffered from
probability neglect and thus should be avoided? In other words,
because of its purported certainty, a cost-benefit analysis, even if used in
Sunstein's limited cognitive sense, threatens to replace, not refine, the
precautionary principle.
In itself, cognitive cost-benefit analysis does not help determine
when regulators should use the precautionary principle. Sunstein
introduces factors to assess when the precautionary principle should be
used:
1. the level of uncertainty that triggersa regulatory response;
2. the magnitude of anticipated harm that justifies such a
response;
3. the tools that will be chosen when the principle applies (tools
such as disclosure -requirements, technological requirements,
or prohibitions); and
4. the margin of safety that applies in the face of doubt.'
The first factor establishes the probability of a risk. The second factor
establishes how much harm that risk poses. The third factor gives
regulators a choice of appropriate responses to risk. This factor rejects
prohibition as the only regulatory response for taking precaution. The
last factor, the margin of safety, applies when there is doubt about the
probability of a risk. As Sunstein notes, "If the magnitude of the harm is
high, then regulators need not require as much evidence that it is

2'Ibid

at 119-20.
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probable. 26 In emergency situations, regulators should act with less
evidence than they normally would require.
These factors, however, do not fit easily into a cognitive costbenefit analysis. Regulators could use these factors to adopt a balance of
harms test, but Sunstein does not mention this alternative.
In a balance of harms approach, the last factor allows regulators
initially to assess what level of evidence they will need to act. The first
two factors weigh the risk of harm of not regulating with the various
risks based on different regulatory responses. The third factor confirms
that prohibition is not the only way that regulators can respond. The
concept of harm more easily encompasses notions of unjust distribution
of harms and irreversible loss than does cost-benefit analysis.
Additionally, a balance of harms test does not purport to give clear
guidance, nor does it relieve regulators from the responsibility of
making decisions. As such, it is a better safeguard on the application of
the precautionary principle than cognitive cost-benefit analysis.
Although the precautionary principle cannot give clear guidance
for many policy issues without addressing underlying cognitive biases or
applying some other measure, such as cognitive cost-benefit analysis,
Sunstein suggests that a limited version of the precautionary
principle-an anti-catastrophe principle--can give guidance in limited
situations. 27 The anti-catastrophe principle calls for regulators to take
precautions against irreparable, catastrophic harms if the risk of those
harms meets a minimum probability threshold and the cost of regulating
is not too great. 28 Although the anti-catastrophe principle is merely an
application of the four factors, listed above, in special circumstances, it
shows that regulators need not rely on cognitive bias to gain guidance
from the precautionary principle if they apply the precautionary
principle in limited circumstances.
IV.

DISCUSSIONS OF LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY OUTSIDE
OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Sunstein's discussion of fear, law, and psychology goes beyond
the precautionary principle. He discusses how law and psychology can
26
27
28
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influence the methods regulators use. In the chapter called "Libertarian
Paternalism," Sunstein demonstrates how two opposing ideas of
regulation can be reconciled. Generally, libertarians embrace freedom
of choice, whereas paternalists believe that a state body should ensure
that citizens reach the most beneficial ends. Although it is accepted that
governments can act paternalistically on some issues and take a
libertarian view on others, Sunstein shows that there is a continuum of
policy decisions.2 9 For example, many employers have optional
retirement savings plans, whereby employees can choose to have a
portion of their salaries put into retirement savings accounts. A common
problem, however, is that not enough workers use these plans to save for
their retirements. In an effort to solve the problem, some employers
created retirement savings plans such that workers were automatically
enrolled in the plan but could opt out at any time. As a result of
changing the default position, there was a significant increase in
employee retirement savings." The opt-out satisfied the libertarian goal
of personal choice while allowing employers to address the larger
problems of decreasing rates of retirement savings.3 Hence, changing
the default position can give regulators more tools with which to
approach problems.
Sunstein also discusses whether certain government measures
should be prohibited based on second-order balancing. A first-order
balancing test weighs risk of harm to parties to determine when
regulators or the judiciary should act. The judiciary can stop a mining
company from drilling, for example, if drilling would affect another
party's property. Second-order balancing, in contrast, weighs the
likelihood of misuses of a policy instrument against its possible uses.
Sunstein summarizes an argument against torture based on secondorder balancing:
It might be concluded not that torture is never justified in principle, but that unless
torture is entirely outlawed, government will engage in torture in cases in which it is not
justified, that the benefits of torture are rarely significant, and that the permission to
torture will lead, on balance, to more harm than good. I am not sure that this view is
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right, but it is entirely plausible. And if it is, we might adopt a barrier to torture, even
3
when public fear is both extreme and entirely justified.

Despite being unconvinced by the second-order balancing
argument against torture, Sunstein questions whether second-order
balancing arguments could be the basis for the defence of other rights.33
However, Sunstein does not explain why he does not find the secondorder balancing argument against torture convincing. If the secondorder balancing argument is unconvincing because it does not weigh
heavily enough in favour of the prohibition of torture, then secondorder balancing arguments are unlikely to be useful for the defence of
any right. It is hard to imagine a second-order balancing argument more
in favour of rights over excessive government action, and thus more
convincing, than the one for the prohibition of torture. Alternatively,
Sunstein may not be convinced by the argument because there is not
enough evidence for the claims that torture will be misused and that it
rarely yields beneficial results. Sunstein, however, offers no test to
determine the level of evidence necessary to justify upholding rights
based on a second-order balancing test. If second-order balancing can
be applied at all, it should be applied to situations where governments
are likely to overreact based on emotions of fear or revenge. The issue
of torture can present such a situation. This is an area where psychology
could be further applied to regulatory analysis to expand the scope and
refine the application of second-order balancing arguments.
CONCLUSION

V.

Sunstein uses cognitive concepts to show that the precautionary
principle in its strongest form is unworkable. Throughout the book,
Sunstein advocates a much weaker form of the precautionary principle.
He suggests incorporating cost-benefit analysis into the precautionary
principle, having a minimum threshold for invoking the anti-catastrophe
principle, and not using the precautionary principle when it is based on
emotions. All of these suggestions would limit the number of scenarios
in which the precautionary principle should be invoked.
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Notably, Sunstein does not reject the precautionary principle. In
its weakest form, the precautionary principle posits that lack of decisive
evidence is not a reason to refuse to regulate. Indeed, the anticatastrophe principle calls for regulation with less than decisive
evidence. Thus, Sunstein's anti-catastrophe principle gives policy
guidance for some scenarios.
Sunstein's most significant contribution to the precautionary
principle is his application of cognitive concepts. By showing the
cognitive biases that underlie the precautionary principle, and by
suggesting ways to avoid those biases, Sunstein's work helps create a
better understanding of the limits of the precautionary principle. By
narrowing its application, Sunstein helps the precautionary principle
become more relevant for regulators.

